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Regulatory Evolution and the Future of
Environmental Policy
Robert V. Percivalt
During the 1970s, U.S. environmental law made a dramatic
transformation from a highly decentralized system built on
private law principles to one dominated by federal legislation
requiring agencies to implement comprehensive, national regula-
tory programs. During the 1980s, Congress expanded and refined
these programs, moving U.S. environmental law far beyond its
common law roots and extending federal regulation to smaller
entities and activities less obviously associated with environ-
mental harm. But as paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould cautions
in his recent book, Full House: The Spread of Excellence from
Plato to Darwin,' one should not assume that an apparent trend
toward greater complexity implies inexorable evolutionary prog-
ress.' Indeed, during the 1990s, the growth of federal environ-
t Professor of Law, Robert Stanton Scholar & Director, Environmental Law Pro-
gram, University of Maryland School of Law. I would like to thank Rachel Schowalter and
Jennifer Lewis for research assistance and Alan S. Miller, Miranda A. Schreurs and the
participants in the Harrison Program on the Future of the Global Agenda, University of
Maryland Department of Government and Politics, for their comments at a workshop in
which the thoughts presented in this paper were presented on October 7, 1996. Portions of
this paper are drawn from testimony previously delivered by the author at a congression-
al hearing. Some of the examples used in the paper are discussed in more detail in Robert
V. Percival, et al, Environmental Regulation: Law, Science & Policy (Little, Brown 2d ed
1996).
' Stephen Jay Gould, Full House: The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin
(Harmony 1996).
2 Id at 18-21. Gould argues that human life may not be "a predictable result of an
inherently progressive progress," but rather "a momentary cosmic accident that would
never arise again if the tree of life could be replanted from seed and regrown under
similar conditions." He premises his argument on the notion that if evolution starts from
a condition of total simplicity with no life forms simpler than bacteria, even random
changes initially can only be in the direction of greater complexity. Therefore, even if
"progress stands out as the major pattern of life's history," evolutionary processes do not
inevitably move in this direction. Gould maintains that "no pervasive or predictable
thrust toward progress permeates the history of life," and that the proper focus should be
on changes in the overall range of variation of biological systems, what he calls the "full
house." Gould argues that his thesis helps explain the disappearance of the .400 hitter in
baseball. He maintains that as the overall quality of play has improved (as humans
approach the "right wall" of athletic excellence), variation in batting averages shrinks,
making the occurrence of extremes far less likely. Id.
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mental law has slowed; basic elements of its regulatory infra-
structure are now undergoing fundamental reexamination on
several fronts. This Article considers what can be learned from
the history of environmental regulation and how these lessons
should be used to shape the future evolution of regulatory policy.
This Article begins by reviewing the history of U.S. environ-
mental regulation. It notes that the transformation of American
environmental law during the 1970s was a product of a remark-
able burst of federal legislation adopted in response to perceived
inadequacies of the common law and frustration with the failure
of decentralized approaches to environmental protection. Adopted
with overwhelming, bipartisan support, these laws directed feder-
al agencies to establish national regulatory programs of breath-
taking complexity and opened the courts to citizen suits to ensure
that they were implemented and enforced. These federal regula-
tory programs made dramatic progress in reducing certain kinds
of pollution, particularly emissions from large industrial point
sources. They created new incentives for careful handling of
hazardous substances, and they helped spawn the development of
"greener" technology. But opponents have criticized current
federal policy as a reflection of misplaced regulatory priorities
and as an inefficient mechanism for improving environmental
quality.
This Article argues that, when viewed from an evolutionary
perspective, the current regulatory infrastructure is neither as
irrational nor as inefficient as its critics have claimed. Despite
acknowledged inefficiencies, the first generation of national
regulations properly focused on achieving broad-based emissions
reductions without requiring detailed inquiry into site-specific
costs and benefits. Regulatory policy has now matured to the
point where greater efforts can be made to address the concerns
for fairness and efficiency that animated the common law stan-
dards it displaced. Recent policy initiatives are taking important
steps in this direction.
While recognizing the benefits of improving the regulatory
system, this Article cautions against sweeping proposals for
"regulatory reform" that are not sufficiently sensitive to the
lessons of history. History suggests that future opportunities to
improve regulatory policy are best pursued in evolutionary, rath-
er than revolutionary fashion. Public confidence in the regulatory
process is essential for environmental policy to succeed; efforts to
promote regulatory reform are doomed to failure if they are
perceived as efforts to relax environmental protections. Proposals
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to impose additional analytical requirements on agencies and to
subject them to more intrusive judicial review would exacerbate
persistent problems with the current regulatory system. These
problems include the ossification of the rulemaking process and
the judiciary's failure to grasp the full implications of the shift
away from common law standards to a system of precautionary
regulation.
I. ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: AN EVOLUTIONARY HISTORY
A. Regulation Before the Rise of the Modern Environmental
Movement
Until the 1970s, the common law was the legal system's
primary vehicle for responding to environmental disputes. For
centuries, courts wrestled with cases raising the quintessential
question of environmental law: how to harmonize conflicts that
occur when human activity adversely affects the quality of life
enjoyed by others.3 The common law relied largely on doctrines
of nuisance law to resolve these conflicts, although physical inva-
sions of property could also be addressed as trespasses.4 The
U.S. Supreme Court occasionally umpired interstate pollution
disputes in cases brought by states under the federal common
law of nuisance,5 though eventually it relegated such actions to
the lower federal courts.6
Federal regulatory legislation to protect public health or the
environment was virtually unknown until the twentieth century.
Congress acted only in response to a few highly visible and wide-
ly publicized problems. In 1838, Congress mandated that safety
regulations be adopted to prevent steamship boilers from explod-
ing.7 Congress acted again in 1912 to respond to a horribly dis-
figuring disease, phosphorus necrosis (also called "phossyjaw" be-
- See, for example, Aldred's Case, 77 Eng Rep 816 (1611); Bamford v Turnley, 122
Eng Rep 27 (1862); St. Helen's Smelting Co. v Tipping, 11 HLC 642 (1865); Susquehanna
Fertilizer Co. v Malone, 73 Md 268, 20 A 900 (1890); Smith v Stasso Milling Co., 18 F2d
736 (2d Cir 1927).
' See, for example, Keppel v Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co., 200 Pa 649, 50 A 302
(1901).
' Missouri v Illinois, 200 US 496 (1906); Georgia v Tennessee Copper Co., 206 US 230
(1907); New York v New Jersey, 256 US 296 (1921); New Jersey v City of New York, 284
US 585 (1931).
' Illinois v Milwaukee, 406 US 91 (1972).
7 Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 Stan L Rev 1189,
1196 (1986). Congress initially adopted legislation regulating steamship boilers in 1838
and then strengthened the law in 1852.
159]
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cause it literally ate away the jaws of workers exposed to white
phosphorus in match manufacturing). The Esch-Hughes Act
sought to prevent this disease by eliminating the use of white
phosphorus in match manufacturing.' Because Congress did not
believe it had the constitutional authority to impose a national
ban, it enacted a federal tax to make it prohibitively expensive to
use white phosphorus.'
Other early federal regulatory legislation, including the Riv-
ers and Harbors Act of 1899,10 the Pure Food and Drug Act of
1906,11 and the Insecticide Act of 1910,12 was spawned largely
by a desire to promote commerce rather than by concern over
public health or environmental protection. The Rivers and Har-
bors Act banned discharges of refuse into navigable waters to
prevent obstructions to the free flow of commerce, which was con-
ducted primarily on waterways at that time. Early food, drug,
and pesticide laws sought to prevent consumers from being de-
frauded by products that were not what they were advertised to
be.1
3
In the absence of comprehensive environmental legislation,
the federal response to the rare health or safety problem that
attracted national attention was to convene a conference of ex-
perts. In 1925, the U.S. Surgeon General convened a conference
to consider the risks of gasoline lead additives after more than a
dozen workers died of lead poisoning in plants manufacturing
tetraethyl lead."' Another conference was convened to address
radium poisoning in workers painting luminous figures on watch-
es."5 Alice Hamilton, a leading public health crusader, lauded
"this entirely informal and extra-legal method that we Americans
have devised" to respond to any "new and striking danger which
Pub L No 62-112, 37 Stat 81 (1912), repealed by Pub L No 76-1, 53 Stat 1 (1939).
Taxing White Phosphorous Matches, House Committee on Ways and Means, HR
Doc No 406, 62d Cong, 2d Sess 5 (1912).
'o Act of March 3, 1899, Ch 425, 30 Stat 1i21.
" Act of June 30, 1906, Ch 3915, 34 Stat 768. repealed by Pub L No 75-717, 52 Stat
1059 (1938).
12 Act of April 26, 1910, 36 Stat 331, repealed by Pub L No 80-125, 61 Stat 172
(1940).
13 Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary
Models, 54 Md L Rev 1141, 1149-50 (1995).
" After conducting a quick study that compared the health of workers at gas stations
that sold leaded and unleaded gasoline, the conference approved continued use of lead ad-
ditives, while recommending measures to improve worker safety. Alice Hamilton, Nineteen
Years in the Poisonous Trades, 159 Harper's Magazine 580, 586 (1929).
5 Id at 587.
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lends itself to newspaper publicity."6 However, she complained
that "it cannot be used to combat old and familiar dangers," or
"newer poisons which do not produce spectacular effects; and
these are much more numerous." 7 These limitations are illus-
trated by the Surgeon General's decision to permit the continued
marketing of lead additives in gasoline. Although the Surgeon
General recognized the possibility that lead emissions from gaso-
line combustion could cause lead poisoning in humans, in the
absence of proof concerning the prospective effects of chronic,
low-level exposure, nearly fifty years passed before federal au-
thorities began regulating lead additives to protect children's
health. 8
After World War II, federal law imposed few regulations on
private industry that were animated by environmental concerns,
but the federal government became involved in encouraging the
states to adopt pollution control measures of their own. The Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act of 1948 provided grants to
states for water pollution control. 9 In 1956, over President
Eisenhower's veto, Congress provided federal funds to municipali-
ties for the construction of sewage treatment plants." Federal
funding was founded on the premise that cities would be reluc-
tant to build sewage treatment plants on their own because these
investments would primarily benefit downstream cities.2' While
this program grew to become a substantial source of federal fi-
nancial assistance to municipalities, it did not impose any federal
pollution control regulations.. The federal government sought
instead to encourage states to adopt their own regulations to pro-
tect water quality.
The federal programs of the 1950s and 1960s reinforced the
notion that environmental problems were the responsibility of
state and local governments. The primary federal role was to
assist with research and funding while letting the states decide
how to control pollution. With expanding economic activity in the
post-World War II era, the interstate character of pollution be-
came increasingly apparent. Awareness that pollutants do not
16 Id.
17 Id.
Hamilton, 159 Harper's Magazine at 587 (cited in note 14).
" Act of June 30, 1948, Ch 758, 62 Stat 1155, codified as amended at 33 USC §§ 1251
et seq (1994).
o Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1956, Pub L No 84-660, 70 Stat 498.
See Percival, 54 Md L Rev at 1155 (cited in note 13).
21 Id.
159]
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respect state, or even national boundaries, grew rapidly as scien-
tists warned that the entire planet was being dangerously poi-
soned by radiation from atmospheric nuclear testing.22 These
and other developments seriously undermined the customary
assumption that the federal role in environmental protection
policy should be a non-regulatory one.
B. The Modern Environmental Revolution
During the 1970s, an explosion of federal legislation erected
the modern federal regulatory infrastructure. These statutes
established the ground rules for national environmental protec-
tion efforts. They mandated that all federal agencies explicitly
consider the environmental impacts of their actions" and prohib-
ited actions that jeopardize endangered species.' They required
the establishment of the first comprehensive limits on air' and
water 2 pollution, and they imposed controls on how toxic sub-
stances2 7 and hazardous wastes"' were to be managed. This
burst of legislative activity occurred just as the judiciary was
opening up the courts to citizens seeking to challenge decisions
affecting the environment.' Congress and the courts gave con-
cerned citizens new tools for challenging these decisions and for
prodding agencies to implement the ambitious new legislative
directives.
The national regulatory legislation that transformed Ameri-
can environmental law during the 1970s was a product of a re-
markable groundswell of public concern for the environment.0
22 Id at 1157.
' National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub L No 91-190, 83 Stat 852, codified
at 42 USC § 4321 et seq (1994).
Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub L No 93-205, 87 Stat 884, codified at 16 USC
§ 1531 et seq (1994).
2' Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub L No 91-604, 84 Stat 1676, codified at 42
USC § 7401 et seq (1994).
" Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub L No 92-500, 86
Stat 816, codified at 33 USC § 1251 et seq (1994).
27 Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub L No 94-469, 90 Stat 2003 (1976), codified at 15
USC § 2601 et seq (1994).
2' Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub L No 94-580, 90 Stat 2795,
42 USC § 6901 et seq (1994).
29 See, for example, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v Volpe, 401 US 402 (1971).
30 Robert Rabin finds it difficult to account for this remarkable legislative activity,
which he describes as the "Public Interest Era." Rabin, 38 Stan L Rev at 1189 (cited in
note 7). Cass Sunstein refers to the enactment of these statutes as part of a "rights
revolution" that was an outgrowth of the New Deal. Cass R. Sunstein, After the Rights
Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatory State (Harvard 1990). While environmental
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With overwhelming, bipartisan support, this legislation revolu-
tionized U.S. administrative law by requiring administrative
agencies to be more responsive to environmental concerns and by
giving citizens access to the courts to ensure that the laws were
implemented and enforced.3' In response to these laws, the judi-
ciary liberalized rules of prudential standing. 2 Federal agencies
were directed to establish and implement national regulatory
programs of breathtaking complexity to prevent harm to human
health and the environment and to guarantee a uniform, mini-
mum level of environmental quality in all areas of the country.
While state governments were given the opportunity to operate
the new federal regulatory programs and to enact even more
stringent regulations if they chose, the federalization of environ-
mental law was widely understood as a response to the abysmal
failure of decentralized approaches to environmental protection.
The new federal regulatory programs mandated that large
industrial polluters reduce their emissions across the board with-
out requiring detailed inquiry into the environmental conse-
quences in any particular locale. Congress adopted this regulato-
ry strategy after years of frustration over the failure of efforts to
base regulations on assessments of the impacts of ambient pol-
lution concentrations. In some cases, the regulatory programs
sought to force the development of new pollution control technolo-
gy, as occurred when automobile manufacturers were required to,
reduce emissions from their products by 90 percent."
In addition to mandating that comprehensive precautions be.
taken to prevent environmental harm, the laws considerably
expanded the class of parties held liable when harm occurred.
With the enactment of the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act in 1980 ("CERCLA),
commonly known as the Superfund legislation, broad classes of
parties associated with releases of hazardous substances were
subjected to strict, joint and several liability for the costs of
remediating environmental contamination.' This represented a
distinct move away from common law standards of liability.
legislation did not refer specifically to "rights," there can be no doubt about the revolution..
ary nature of the legislation.
" See, for example, Clean Air Act, 42 USC § 7604 (1994).
32 See United States v Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 US
669 (1973).
' Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 § 6, Pub L No 91-604, 84 Stat 1676, 1690,
codified at 42 USC §1857f-l(bX1X(A) (1970).
3 Pub L No 96-510, 94 Stat 2787, codified at 42 USC § 9601 et seq (1994).
159]
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The judiciary played a prominent role in the implementation
of the new federal regulatory programs as virtually every major
environmental regulation became the subject of a court challenge.
By the narrowest of margins, the U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed
the Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA"),efforts to limit
the lead content of gasoline, endorsing preventative regulation,
even in the absence of clear proof of harm."5 Four years later,
the U.S. Supreme Court qualified this endorsement by indicating
that agencies implementing precautionary legislation should first
determine that risks are significant before imposing costly regu-
lations to reduce them.3" The Court quickly clarified that this
did not require the use of cost-benefit analysis in circumstances
where Congress had not expressly mandated it.
7
As the initial generation of federal environmental laws was
reauthorized by Congress, they were broadened, strengthened,
and made more specific. Comprehensive amendments to the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") were adopted in
1984,38 to CERCLA 9 and the Safe Drinking Water Act 4° in
1986, to the Clean Water Act in 1987,41 and to the Clean Air Act
in 1990.42 Many of the amendments enacted during this period
tried to force the federal environmental agencies to implement
the environmental laws in a more expeditious fashion. Faced
with an executive branch less sympathetic to environmental con-
cerns, Congress imposed new deadlines for agency action and
established specific sanctions for agencies who failed to carry out
the law. "Hammer" provisions written into some laws specified
regulations that would take effect automatically when an agency
' Ethyl Corp. v EPA, 541 F2d 1 (DC Cir 1976) (en banc). The 5-4 decision reversed a
2-1 panel decision that had struck down EPA's regulation on the ground that the agency
failed to prove actual harm from auto emissions of lead. The court explained that in the
face of scientific uncertainty, it would "not demand rigorous step-by-step proof of cause
and effect," because it "may be impossible to obtain if the precautionary purpose of the
statute is to be served." Id at 113.
" Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v American Petroleum Institute, 448 US
607, 639 (1980) ("Benzene").
3 American Textile Manufacturers Institute v Donovan, 452 US 490, 512 (1981).
Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub L No 98-616, 98 Stat 3224,
codified at 42 USC § 6901 et seq (1994).
"' Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub L No 99-499, 100
Stat 1615, codified at 42 USC § 9601 et seq (1994).
" Safe Drinking Water Amendments of 1986, Pub L No 99-339, 100 Stat 642, codified
at 42 USC § 300f et seq (1994).
" Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub L No 100-4, 101 Stat 7, codified at 33 USC § 1251
et seq (1994).
4 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub L No 101-549, 104 Stat 2399, codified at
42 USC § 7401 et seq (1994).
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failed to adopt its own regulations by a particular date. For ex-
ample, the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984
provided that all land disposal of certain hazardous wastes would
be banned by specified dates unless an express determination
was made that particular levels of treatment were sufficient to
avoid future environmental problems.' Sanctions for violating
the environmental laws also increased dramatically, with sub-
stantial criminal penalties imposed for intentional violations."
These programs made dramatic progress in reducing certain
kinds of air and water pollution, particularly emissions from
large industrial point sources, and they created powerful incen-
tives for more careful handling of hazardous substances. But they
came under considerable fire, particularly from regulated indus-
tries who argued that they were inefficient and inequitable mech-
anisms for improving environmental quality. These criticisms
have intensified as environmental law's regulatory tentacles have
been extended to embrace smaller entities and to affect develop-
ment decisions by individual property owners.
C. Rethinking Environmental Regulation
As environmental regulation has matured, federal agencies
have begun to pursue more innovative forms of regulation. These
include increased use of informational approaches to regulation
(to help harness market forces to prevent pollution) and the cre-
ation of marketable emissions allowances (to reduce compliance
costs). In response to pressures to relax the environmental laws,
the Clinton administration has launched a series of initiatives to
"reinvent regulation," urging more flexibility and a reduction in
unnecessary regulatory burdens.4 As a result, agencies have
begun to experiment with new regulatory approaches such as
environmental contracting and challenge regulations that prom-
ise reduced compliance burdens in return for improved environ-
mental performance.
The pendulum that swung so powerfully toward environmen-
tal regulation during the 1970s and 1980s began to move back in
the 1990s with the rise to power of a Congress and a judiciary
decidedly more skeptical about government regulation. Even
before the Republican sweep of the 1994 congressional elections,
43 § 201(a), 98 Stat at 3226-33, codified at 42 USC § 6924(dXl).
See, for example, RCRA, 42 USC § 6928, amended by Hazardous and Solid Waste
Amendments of 1984, 98 Stat at 3256-57.
"s Bill Clinton and Al Gore, Reinventing Environmental Regulation (1995).
1591
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efforts to reauthorize some of the major federal environmental
statutes had failed in both the 102d and 103d Congresses." Al-
though their Contract With America did not mention the word
"environment," the new Republican majority in the 104th Con-
gress pursued an agenda that included sweeping cutbacks in
environmental laws. Most of these initiatives failed, though Con-
gress did enact the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act in March
1995.4' The Act makes it procedurally more difficult to apply
new environmental regulations to entities of state and local gov-
ernments unless federal funding for compliance is provided.
A bill that would have dramatically weakened the Clean
Water Act passed the House in 1995,4 but the prospects of a
presidential veto and an election-year "greening" of Congress
made it impossible to enact any legislation that would rollback
major provisions of the federal environmental laws."9 Congress
instead used appropriations riders to prevent implementation
and enforcement of various provisions of the environmental laws
during the period covered by the appropriations. For instance, in
appropriations legislation that became law in 1995, Congress
imposed a temporary freeze on the listing of new endangered
species and required the U.S. Forest Service to increase timber
harvests on federal lands.50
In March 1995, the House of Representatives approved legis-
lation that would have required all major regulatory decisions to
be justified on the basis of cost-benefit analyses.5 However, the
104th Congress ultimately failed to enact such sweeping regula-
tory reform legislation, including proposals for a regulatory mora-
torium, requirements that future regulations meet risk assess-
ment and cost-benefit criteria, and requirements that landowners
be compensated when the value of their property is adversely
affected by regulation.52 When it extended the federal debt limit
, Percival, 54 Md L Rev at 1167 (cited in note 13).
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub L No 104-4, 109 Stat 48.
Clean Water Act Amendments of 1995, HR 961, 104th Cong, 1st Ses (Feb 15,
1995), in 141 Cong Rec D 612 (May 16, 1995).
41 Peter M. Lehner, The Debate Over Clear Water: Amendments Point to Costs of
Pollution, NY L J S1 (June 12, 1995).
0 Pub L No 104-6, 109 Stat 73, 86 (1995).
HR 9, 104th Cong, 1st Seas (Jan 4, 1995), in 141 Cong Rec S 3743 (Mar 9, 1995).
These and other proposals to mandate risk assessment and cost-benefit analyses are dis-
cussed in Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State,
48 Stan L Rev 247 (1996); David A. Wirth and Ellen K. Silbergeld, Risky Reform, 95
Colum L Rev 1857 (1995); and Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk
Regulation, 95 Colum L Rev 1613, 1696 n 318, 1713 n 381 (1995).
52 These proposals, whose basic components were embodied in Comprehensive Regu-
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in March 1996, Congress did incorporate some aspects of the
regulatory reform bills in legislation that targeted regulations
affecting small businesses.53 Called the Small Business Regula..
tory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 ("SBREFA"), this legis..
lation has been dubbed "stealth regulatory reform" by Professor
William Funk."
Overall, however, environmental law's basic regulatory infra..
structure survived the assaults of the 104th Congress. Indeed, it
was arguably strengthened by the surprising enactment of con.-
sensus food safety and safe drinking water legislation adopted
with uncommon speed late in the session." Thus, in hindsight,
early predictions that the 104th Congress might represent EL
"constitutional moment" for dramatically altering the legacy of
the New Deal" appear to have missed the mark, at least with
respect to environmental regulation. Indeed, it is arguable that
the election year "greening" of a Congress that had been so hos-
latory Reform Act of 1995, S 343, 104th Cong, Ist Sess (Feb 2, 1995), in 141 Cong Rec S
9261 (June 28, 1995), in the Senate, and HR 9 (cited in note 51), and the Risk Assessment
and Cost Benefit Act of 1995, HR 1022, 104th Cong, 1st Sess (Feb 23, 1995), in 141 Cong
Rec H 2261 (Feb 27, 1996), in the House, are discussed in more detail in Sunstein, 43
Stan L Rev at 274-82 (cited in note 51).
' Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-121,
110 Stat 857, codified at 5 USC § 551 et seq (1994 & Supp 1996) ("SBREFA7). The
SBREFA has three particularly significant provisions. First, it requires agencies to give
greater consideration to the impact of regulation on small businesses when rules are
being developed that may adversely affect such businesses. This includes a requirement
that EPA and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") give repre-
sentatives of small businesses an opportunity to review and comment on rules that may
affect them before the rules are proposed publicly. Most significantly, SBREFA makes
agency compliance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 USC §§ 601-612 (1994), subject
to judicial review. Second, SBREFA requires that all rules issued by federal agencies be
sent first to Congress for review 60 days before taking effect. The legislation creates
special fast-track procedures for the enactment of resolutions disapproving the rules.
Third, SBREFA seeks to ease the burden of environmental enforcement on small entitiee.
It requires agencies to provide for waivers or reductions in civil penalties imposed on
small businesses. Furthermore, it amends the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 USC § 2412
(1994 & Supp 1996), to authorize court awards of attorneys fees to small businesses who
violate the law if the penalty initially sought by the government is found to be unrea-
sonable and substantially in excess of the final penalty levied.
" William Funk, More Stealth Regulatory Reform, 21 Admin & Reg L News 1 (Sum-
mer 1996).
The Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, Pub L No 104-182, 110 Stat
1613 (1996), codified at 42 USC § 300f et seq (1994 & Supp 1996), broadly supported by
state and local officials, environmentalists, and industry groups, were approved unani-
mously in the Senate and by a 392-30 margin in the House. 1996 USCCAN 1366. The
Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-170, 110 Stat 1489, codified at 7 USC
§136, 21 USC § 301 et seq (1994 & Supp 1996), passed unanimously in the House on July
23, 1996 and in the Senate the following day. 1996 USCCAN 1208.
' Sunstein, 48 Stan L Rev at 251 (cited in note 51).
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tile to environmental concerns has confirmed the strength of
public support for environmental regulation and the vitality of
the existing regulatory infrastructure.57 Yet, for reasons de-
scribed below, initiatives to increase the flexibility of environ-
mental regulation most likely will continue to be pursued.58
These efforts are being undertaken at a time when the feder-
al judiciary has become less sympathetic toward environmental
concerns. Despite doctrines of deference to administrative agen-
cies, a judiciary more skeptical of regulation has struck down
major environmental regulations by insisting that agencies pro-
vide greater and more specific evidentiary support for them.
Important regulatory initiatives, such as the EPA's effort to
phase out all remaining uses of asbestos, have been struck down
on grounds that harken back to the common law's demand for
detailed proof of particularized injury." Despite broad citizen
suit provisions in the environmental laws, the courts are showing
signs of reviving common-law doctrines of legal injury as a predi-
cate for recognition of standing to sue." Judicial resuscitation of
constitutional principles of state sovereignty now threatens to
undermine national regulatory programs. For the first time in
more than 60 years, the Supreme Court has struck down a feder-
al regulatory program on the grounds that it exceeded the consti-
tutional authority of Congress to regulate interstate commerce."'
While this decision did not occur in an environmental case, lower
courts may now insist on more particularized showings of inter-
state impact to uphold federal environmental regulations 2 and
" See John H. Cushman, Jr., G.O.P. Backing Off From Tough Stand Over Environ-
ment, NY Times Al (Jan 26, 1996); The Environmental Counterattack, NY Times A14 (Feb
5, 1996).
' Timothy Noah, Both Parties Paint Themselves Green, but Trend of Looser Environ-
mental Rules Is Seen Continuing, Wall St J A18 (Sept 9, 1996).
" Corrosion Proof Fittings v EPA, 947 F2d 1201, 1215 (5th Cir 1991).
o See, for example, Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v Magnesium
Elektron, Inc., 123 F3d 111 (3rd Cir 1997); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v Crown Central
Petroleum, 95 F3d 358, 360 (5th Cir 1996).
81 United States v Lopez, 514 US 549, 567-68 (1995).
62 In United States v Olin Corp., 927 F Supp 1502 (S D Ala 1996), a federal district
judge refused to approve a consent decree covering a $10.4 million cleanup of soil and
groundwater contamination at the site of a chemical plant that had been closed in 1982.
Id at 1503-04. The judge found that Lopez required him to dismiss the case. While he con-
ceded that application of CERCLA to an operating chemical plant could involve the
regulation of economic activity that "substantially affects" interstate commerce under
Lopez, he concluded that because the plant that caused the contamination had been closed
in 1982, the application of CERCLA to the site cleanup did not involve regulation of
"economic activity" or "commerce," permissible under the Commerce Clause. Id at 1532.
Rather the case involved only "clean-up of real property," which "has been traditionally a
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some courts have struck down such regulations for infringing on.
state sovereignty.6 By requiring more detailed demonstrations
of causal injury or effects on interstate commerce, these decisions
make it more difficult to achieve the law's promise of preventa-
tive regulation, resurrecting the very deficiencies of the common-
law that public law sought to overcome.
II. LESSONS FROM THE HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION
At present, there is a remarkable burst of interest in "re--
thinking" or "reinventing" the next generation of environmental
regulations. More than a dozen major initiatives involving gov.-
ernment officials, academics, industry groups, and think tanks
are underway to help design new approaches to environmental
policy.' Several major reports addressing these issues already
local matter falling under the police power of the states." Id. The judge went on to suggest
that CERCLA exceeds congressional authority because it does not have any "jurisdictional
element" that ensures "through case-by-case inquiry" that it affects interstate commerce.
Id at 1533. Even if it had such a provision, he declared, "the particular inquiry in this
case clearly demonstrates that the activity in question has virtually no effect on interstate
commerce" because the contamination mostly affects a "locally-contained alluvial aquifer"
and "there is no evidence that contaminants at [the site] travel across state lines." Id.
This decision subsequently was reversed on appeal. United States v Olin Corp., 107 F3d
1506 (11th Cir 1997).
" See, for example, ACORN v Edwards, 81 F3d 1387 (5th Cir 1996) (voiding require-
ment that states establish remedial programs for removal of lead contamination from
school and day-care drinking water systems on grounds that it violated the Tenth Amend-
ment).
" Former EPA administrator William Ruckelshaus is currently chairing a policy
forum called Enterprise for the Environment, which includes representatives from indus-
try, government, and environmental groups. Coordinated by the Center for Strategic &
International Studies and the National Academy of Public Administration, the project is
seeking "to build a broad, durable, bipartisan consensus for comprehensive reform and
improvement of the environmental management system and the economic policies that
drive public and private decisions affecting the environment." Enterprise for the Environ-
ment, The Enterprise for the Environment Summary 2 (draft paper, June 3, 1996). The
EPA has convened a workgroup on Reinventing EPA & Environmental Policy and the
agency has responded to a National Academy of Public Administration report by setting
up a Statutory Integration Project that is gathering more information "on the need for
and possible mechanisms for better integrating environmental statutes." EPA, EPA
Reinvention Activity Fact Sheets: Statutory Integration Project (June 1, 1997)
<www.epa.gov/ooaujeag/old.reinvent.pages/stip.htm>. Yale Law School convened more
than a dozen expert panels to consider similar issues in what it calls The Next Generation
Project. Marian R. Chertow and Daniel C. Esty, Thinking Ecologically: The Next Genera-
tion of Environmental Policy (Yale 1997). The Aspen Institute ("Environment in the 21st
Century"), Resources for the Future ("The Alternative Path"), and the National Environ-
mental Policy Institute also are involved in similar projects. The Alternative Path: States,
Issues, and Concerns, (Resources for the Future 1996).
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have been completed, including studies by the National Academy
of Public Administration," the Office of Technology Assess-
ment," and the President's Council on Sustainable Develop-
ment.6 7 The intense interest in this subject may make this an
auspicious time to consider what can be learned from past experi-
ence with environmental regulation and how these lessons can be
applied to improve future regulatory policy.
After more than a quarter century of experience with com-
prehensive, national regulatory programs to protect the environ-
ment, the United States now has a rich history that offers valu-
able lessons for shaping future regulatory policy. Outlined below
are some observations from this history that may be relevant to
guide the development of future policy.
A. Regulatory Priorities
One important lesson from the history of environmental
regulation is that it has been far easier for regulatory policy to
respond to acute incidents of highly visible harm than to prob-
lems caused by low-level, chronic exposures. This is well illustrat-
ed by early federal efforts to prevent steamship boilers from
exploding and to phase out the use of white phosphorus in match
manufacturing. The availability of scientific knowledge is an
important influence on regulatory priorities, but public aware-
ness of risk is an even more potent factor in the priority-setting
process. Despite general knowledge concerning the toxicity of
lead, the federal government responded much more rapidly to
problems of exploding steamship boilers and workers whose jaws
were disintegrating than it did to massive childhood lead poison-
ing from lead-based paint, lead in gasoline, and other chronic
exposures. History demonstrates that regulatory attention is far
less likely to be devoted to chronic, low-level environmental haz-
ards than it is to acute, highly visible incidents that grab the
headlines.
To be sure, the deaths of workers producing tetraethyl lead
in the 1920s briefly focused the attention of public health author-
ities on the potential long-term health effects of lead in gasoline.
National Academy of Public Administration, Setting Priorities, Getting Results: A
New Direction for EPA (1995).
" U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Environmental Policy Tools: A
User's Guide (GPO 1995).
67 The President's Council on Sustainable Development, Sustainable America: A New
Consensus (GPO 1996).
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Public alarm provided an opportunity for the Surgeon General's
Conference to consider whether to stop the release of a toxic
metal that ultimately produced widespread poisoning in a largely
invisible manner. Unfortunately, public health authorities were
unable to prove that lead additives would produce such harm and
they failed to monitor adequately the long-term effects of the lead
emissions. For nearly fifty years, virtually no research was per-
formed, independent of that conducted by the lead industry. Iron-
ically, the Surgeon General's Conference created an unwarranted
perception that the safety of lead additives had been settled, at
least for purposes of regulatory decisionmaking.
The myopic tendency of regulatory policy to overlook the
effects of long-term, chronic exposures in favor of responding to
the headline-grabbing crisis of the moment is well documented.
Indeed, it was almost by coincidence that regulatory attention
eventually focused on the health effects of lead additives. The
initial EPA restrictions on the use of leaded gasoline were a
response to the need to protect catalytic converters, rather than
humans, from the effects of lead.' Similarly, the eventual deci-
sion to reduce drastically lead levels in gasoline was set in mo-
tion by frustration with the misfueling problem, as much as by
concern over the health effects of lead emissions. 9
Reviewing the history of occupational health, Henry Selleck
notes that "the biggest steps toward protection of life and limb
have stemmed from the greatest tragedies-a war, a holocaust, a
disaster that rouses human indignation and starts a public clam-
or for drastic action."0 Dan Farber -ccounts for the ability of
legislators to enact environmental laws that appear to overcome
collective action problems by using the concept of "republican
moments."7 The history of environmental law seems to suggest
that Congress and the EPA respond to perceived crises that de-
mand public attention: for example, CERCLA7 was enacted in
response to Love Canal and other incidents generating wide-
spread public concern over uncontrolled hazardous waste sites;
Warren T. Piver, Potential Dilemma: The Methods of Meeting Automotive Exhaust
Emission Standards of the Clean Air Act of 1970, 8 Envir Health Persp 165, 166 (1974).
6' Alvin Alm, The Multimedia Approach to Pollution Control: An Impossible Dream?,
in National Research Council, Multimedia Approaches to Pollution Control: Symposium
Proceedings 114 (NRC 1987).
70 Henry B. Selleck, Occupational Health in America 36 (Wayne State 1962).
Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J L Econ & Org
59 (1992).
72 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,
Pub L No 96-510, 94 Stat 2767, codified at 42 USC § 9601 et seq (1994).
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the origins of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-
Know Act73 can be traced to the Bhopal tragedy; and the Exxon
Valdez oil spill broke more than a decade of legislative gridlock
and produced the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.14
In light of the reactive nature of much environmental legisla-
tion, the EPA's discovery that its priorities are more in line with
the public's perception of risk than with experts' comparative risk
assessments is hardly surprising.75 But it does not necessarily
follow that placing more emphasis on comparisons of quantitative
risks will dramatically improve regulatory priority-setting. Many
scientists believe that too much emphasis already has been
placed on controlling more easily quantifiable cancer risks than
on regulating other environmental health risks. This may be a
product of regulatory policy's increasing emphasis on risk assess-
ment, since techniques for quantitative assessments of risk are
better developed for cancer than for neurological, reproductive, or
developmental risks. While regulators often assume that regula-
tions to protect against cancer will also protect against other
health risks, scientists are now beginning to question the accura-
cy of such assumptions.76
Data limitations also make the use of comparative risk as-
sessments problematic. The EPA's Unfinished Business study
found that it was virtually impossible to perform any rigorous,
quantitative assessments of risks other than cancer." While the
agency attempted to provide rough qualitative rankings of cancer
and non-cancer health effects, ecological risks and risks of eco-
nomic damage, it found that data were simply inadequate to
perform rigorous risk assessments of most existing problems and
that even rough rank-orderings were virtually impossible for new
activities such as biotechnology and new toxic chemicals. 7 The
study found serious conceptual difficulties in comparing risks
" Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, Pub L No 99-499,
100 Stat 1729, 42 USC § 11001 et seq (1994).
Pub L No 101-380, 104 Stat 486, codified at 33 USC § 2701 et seq (1994). See
Daniel C. Esty, What's the Risk in Risk? 13 Yale J Reg 603, 608 (1996) (reviewing the
explanations of John D. Graham and Jonathan B. Wiener, Risk versus Risk: Tradeoffs in
Protecting Health and the Environment (Harvard 1995), for why misguided risk compari-
sons are so frequent).
75 EPA, Unfinished Business: A Comparative Assessment of Environmental Problems
(EPA 1987); EPA Science Advisory Board, Reducing Risk: Appendix A (EPA 1990).
76 See, for example, Ann Gibbons, Reproductive Toxicity: Regs Slow to Change, 254
Science 25 (1991).
" EPA, Unfinished Business at xvi, 98 (cited in note 75).
78 Id at 99.
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that are fundamentally different in character (for example, com-
paring ecological risks to cancer risks and °comparing risks of
damage to developmental, immunological, reproductive, or re-
spiratory systems). It also concluded that environmental expo-
sure data were surprisingly poor.79
The fact that environmental regulation has not yet succeeded
in adopting a "worst first" approach to priority setting does not
imply that the environmental and health risks it has addressed
are massively overregulated. Regulatory agencies have had enor-
mous difficulties in discharging even their most basic responsi-
bilities, reducing the danger that any agency would overreact to
truly trivial risks. However, resistance from politically influential
industries has kept some significant risks from being controlled,
producing legitimate complaints about regulatory priorities.
Most criticisms of regulatory priorities fall into one of three
categories: (1) complaints about the high cost of remediating
environmental contamination after it has occurred, (2) criticisms
of regulations that control substances or activities that have
trivial or non-unique benefits, or (3) criticisms of regulations that
respond to risks whose involuntary character renders them par-
ticularly offensive to the public. Most of the regulations that are
the targets of these criticisms can be understood as rational re-
sponses to risk rather than as products of forces inexorably pro-
ducing massive overregulation. First, the extraordinarily high
cost of cleaning up environmental contamination largely reflects
the relatively primitive state of remediation technology and coun-
sels in favor of making greater efforts to prevent environmental
releases before they occur. Second, even very tiny risks are not
worth accepting if they produce trivial benefits (such as color
additives covered by the color additives Delaney Clause.)0
Third, the fact that people voluntarily incur some risks that are
substantially larger than those targeted by environmental regula-
tion, does not make those regulations irrational. Individuals are
willing to accept greater degrees of risk from activities that they
can choose to avoid (voluntary risks) than from those that they
have little or no choice about (involuntary risks). Risk has been
defined as "the sum of hazard and outrage" because
voluntariness, control, and fairness are important components of
how the public assesses the acceptability of risk.8 Thus, it is
7 Id at 18-19.
'o Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 USC § 376(b)(5XB) (1994). See Public Citizen v
Young, 831 F2d 1108 (DC Cir 1987).
"I Peter M. Sandman, Risk Communication: Facing Public Outrage, EPA J 21-22
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appropriate to question whose behavior is more irrational: the
public or the risk manager who "continues to ignore these fac-
tors-and continues to be surprised by the public's response of
outrage. "82
B. The Costs and Benefits of Environmental Regulation
Critics argue that environmental regulation has been grossly
inefficient.' They are particularly critical of the use of com-
mand-and-control and technology-based regulation in the major pollu-
tion control statutes." These criticisms tend to overlook several
factors that should be considered when dispassionately assessing
the merits of the current regulatory infrastructure. First, from an
evolutionary perspective, the initial choice of a regulatory strate-
gy that required broadly-based emissions reductions may not
have been such a bad investment. Former EPA administrator
Russell Train maintains that the pollution problems facing the
country in the early 1970s were sufficiently grave that virtually
any approach that produced emissions reductions was a
worthwhile first step.' As Carol Rose has argued, regulatory
strategies that employ command-and-control approaches initially
are likely to have lower administrative costs than are emissions
trading schemes, at least until the pressures of resource use
reach a certain level." Thus, it may have made good sense to
emphasize a command-and-control regulatory approach to
achieve the initial reductions in emissions. 7
Second, claims that environmental regulation has paid inade-
quate attention to cost considerations frequently are exaggerated,
(Nov 1987).
82 Id at 22.
See, for example, Bruce A. Ackerman and Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environ-
mental Law, 37 Stan L Rev 1333 (1985); Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Substance,
1991 Duke L J 607; Richard H. Pildes and Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory
State, 62 U Chi L Rev 1, 96 (1995).
" Ackerman and Stewart, 37 Stan L Rev at 1334-40 (cited in note 83); Sunstein,
Administrative Substance, 1991 Duke L J at 627-31 (cited in note 83); Pildes and
Sunstein, 62 U Chi L Rev at 96-99 (cited in note 83).
' Status of the Programs and Policies of the Environmental Protection Agency,
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Environmental Pollution of the Senate Committee on
Public Works, 95th Cong, 1st Seas 9 (1977) (Statement of Russell E. Train, Administrator,
EPA).
8 Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for
Common Resources, 1991 Duke L J 1, 14-24.
87 See, for example, Thomas W. Zosel, Is Integrated Legislation A Good Idea? Neces-
sary? Desirable? Possible?, in Resources for the Future, Materials for a Conference on Inte-
grated Environmental Legislation (June 3, 1996).
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sometimes woefully. Environmental law is rarely cost-blind; cost
considerations inevitably are factored into regulatory decisions alt
some level. Some environmental statutes explicitly require regu-
lators to balance costs and benefits.' Others require that eco-
nomic feasibility be considered when standards are developed."
Even the laws that demand that health-based goals be set with-
out consideration of costs90 generally permit costs to be consid-
ered in determining how to pursue these goals. For example,
while the Clean Air Act requires that national ambient air quali-
ty standards ("NAAQSs") be established without consideration of
costs, states may and do consider costs in crafting their imple-
mentation plans for achieving them."
Since 1981, it has been the official policy of the executive
branch of the federal government to require agencies to consider
the costs and benefits of major regulatory decisions except where
prohibited by law.92 Statutes that explicitly forbid consideration
of costs are extremely rare. The classic examples of cost-blind
statutes are the Delaney Clauses of the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act, which ban the use of carcinogenic food or color ad-
ditives in processed foods,93 and Section 112 of the Clean Air
Act, governing emissions standards for hazardous air pollut-
ants." The color additives Delaney Clause can be understood as
representing a kind of global cost-benefit judgment by Congress
that the unique benefits of any particular color additive are likely
to be so trivial as to not make it worth weighing costs and bene-
fits. In the rare case when application of the food additives
Delaney Clause threatened to have substantial economic im-
See, for example, Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 USC § 2605 (1994); Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Environmental Rodenticide Control Act, 7 USC § 136a(d)
(1994).
' See Clean Water Act, 33 USC § 1311(bX2)(A) (1994); Occupational Safety and
Health Act, 29 USC § 655(bX5) (1994) ("OSH Act). See also United Steelworkers of
America v Marshall, 647 F2d 1189, 1264-65 (DC Cir 1980) (stating that feasibility limitai-
tion in OSH Act requires consideration of economic as well as technological feasibility).
'0 See Clean Air Act, 42 USC § 7409 (1994); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 USC
§ 300g-l(bX3X5) (1994).
"' Natural Resources Defense Council v EPA, 902 F2d 962, 972-73 (DC Cir 1990)
(stating that once a requisite exposure level is determined, cost can be considered in
reaching that level).
' Executive Order 12,291, 3 CFR 127 (1981); Executive Order 12,866, 3 CFR 638
(1993).
13 21 USC § 376(bX5), (8).
- 42 USC § 7412.
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pact,9" Congress promptly changed the law to bar its application
to pesticide residues on processed foods.9"
Indeed, regulations that threaten to impose truly draconian
costs almost inevitably are blocked or modified before taking
effect. For example, one of the primary targets of Richard
Epstein's criticisms of environmental regulation-the mandatory
employer trip reduction requirements of the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments-is a program that was repealed by Congress be-
fore taking effect. 7 The RCRA hazardous waste listing for wood-
preserving chemicals that the Office of Management and Budget
("OMB") made famous by estimating that it would cost several
trillion dollars per life saved never became effective; it was modi-
fied by the EPA in a manner that satisfied most of the industry's
objections."8
Studies of the regulatory process have found that cost consid-
erations do in fact influence decisions concerning health-based
standards.9 While some argue that it would be better to consid-
er costs explicitly when setting standards, 1°° ostensibly cost-
blind standards can help stimulate the development of improved
pollution control technology. Thus, they can be rationalized as
important elements of efforts to ascertain where technology-forc-
ing can be pursued with greatest promise. Regulations that con-
Following the decision in Les v Reilly, 968 F2d 985 (9th Cir 1992) (EPA's refusal to
revoke regulation permitting use of four pesticides as food additives on grounds that
chemicals caused only de minimis risk found contrary to Delaney Clause), the EPA was
faced with the prospect of having to revoke the tolerances for many widely-used pesticides
that contained carcinogens. This helped produce the compromise legislation barring
application of the Delaney Clause to petticide residues on foods in the Food Quality
Protection Act.
" Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 § 221, Pub L No 104-170, 110 Stat 1489, 1502.
97 § 102, Pub L No 101-549, 104 Stat 2399, 2437, codified at 42 USC § 7511a(dX1XB),
repealed by Pub L No 104-70, 109 Stat 773 (1995). See Richard A. Epstein, Simple Rules
for a Complex World 283-85 (Harvard 1995).
" 57 Fed Reg 61492 (1992). See also Standards for Wood Preserving Wastes to
Become Less Stringent Under Final Rule, 23 Envir Rptr (BNA) 1867 (1992).
" Marc K Landy, Marc J. Roberts, and Stephen R. Thomas, The Environmental
Protection Agency: Asking the Wrong Questions 49-88 (Oxford expanded ed 1994) (finding
that cost considerations had a significant influence on the EPA's decision to relax the
National Ambient Air Quality Standards ("NAAQSs") for ozone from 0.08 to 0.12 ppm);
John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 Ecol L Q 233, 251 (1990) (De-
spite clear indications that Congress intended to prohibit cost considerations in setting
standards for hazardous air pollutants under Section 112 of Clean Air Act, EPA continues
to weigh costs in setting standards.).
" George Eads, The Confusion of Goals and Instruments: The Explicit Consideration
of Costs in Setting National Ambient Air Quality Standards, in Mary Gibson, ed, To
Breathe Freely: Risk, Consent, and Air 222-32 (Institute for Philosophy & Public Policy
1985).
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front industry with the prospect of substantial compliance costs
create greater incentives for the development of cheaper control.
technology. Time and time again, after regulations have gone
into effect, regulatory targets have proven able to do what they,
previously claimed was impossible when they were seeking to
forestall the regulations. A study of industrial responses to regu-.
lation found that the stringency of regulation was "the most im-
portant factor influencing technological innovation. 01 For ex-
ample, in the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act, Congress
mandated that gasoline be reformulated to burn more clean-
ly. 2 William Rosenberg, who was then EPA Assistant Admin-
istrator for Air, explained: "Three days before the conference
committee finished its work, representatives from the oil industry
said they couldn't make reformulated gas to meet the standard.
Three days after they finished, Amoco started selling it on Penn-
sylvania Avenue."1 8
When health-based regulation has not succeeded in forcing
the development of necessary technology within the time frame
required for compliance, public policy inevitably permits deadline
extensions or the relaxation of standards, as illustrated by the
extensive non-compliance with the NAAQSs for ozone in many
areas of the country. The Clean Air Act now explicitly allows
differential compliance timeliness depending upon the severity of
nonattainment in particular air quality control regions.' °4 Thus,
even laws that appear to require nationally uniform, health..
based standards have been implemented in a manner that toler.-
ates considerable regional variation in the severity of compliance
timetables."5
As environmental regulation has matured, regulators and
legislators have become more attuned to cost considerations. For
example, the costs and benefits of the 1990 Amendments to the
Clean Air Act were debated in great detail.' The fact that
'o' See Nicholas A. Ashford, Understanding Technological Responses of Industrial
Firms to Environmental Problems: Implications for Government Policy, in Kurt Fischer
and Johan Schot, eds, Environmental Strategies for Industry 282 (Island 1993).
"02 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub L No 101-549, 104 Stat 2399, 2488,
codified at 42 USC § 7545(k) (1994).
1"3 Bush Signs Clean Air Act Amendments, Predicts Benefits for All U.S. Citizens, 21
Envir Rptr (BNA) 1387 (1990).
,o 42 USC § 7545(kX2XB).
,o6 See James E. Krier, On the Topology of Uniform Environmental Standards in a
Federal System-And Why It Matters, 54 Md L Rev 1226, 1231 (1995).
10" See, for example, Paul R. Portney, Economics and the Clean Air Act, reprinted in
136 Cong Rec H 12916 (Oct 26, 1990).
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Congress overwhelmingly approved the law despite warnings
that it would produce double-digit billions in net costs suggests
either that Congress disagreed with these estimates or that it
decided that the legislation was worthwhile on other grounds. 1 7
In retrospect, Congress appears to have chosen wisely. The
amendments' costs have been far less, and their benefits far
greater, than initially forecast, as even some opponents of the
legislation have now conceded."
The prospective costs and benefits of environmental regula-
tion are virtually always subject to considerable uncertainty.
Many regulations produce environmental benefits that are diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to quantify. Thus, it is not surprising to
find that benefits estimates are incomplete or not quantified for
most environmental rules,"° often making their costs seem
greater than their benefits. Experience also has demonstrated
that cost estimates are frequently overstated while benefits are
understated for several reasons. First, it is in the strategic inter-
est of regulatory targets to exaggerate prospective costs in an
effort to avoid regulation. Some of the most striking evidence of
exaggerated cost projections is provided by the precipitous decline
in the cost of reducing sulfur dioxide emissions under Title IV of
the Clean Air Act."0 When the 1990 Amendments were debat-
ed, industry representatives projected that allowances to emit a
ton of SO2 could sell for $1,000 to $1,500 per ton based on their
estimates of the cost of installing pollution control equipment to
achieve the emissions reductions required by Title IV."' The
EPA estimated that the reductions would cost around $750 per
ton; actual costs have proven to be substantially lower."' Early
allowance sales were reported to have been made at prices rang-
ing from $250 to $400 per allowance.' When auctioned by the
"07 See Robert M. Friedman, Air Pollution Benefit-Cost Assessment, 253 Science 607
(1991). See also Sidney A. Shapiro and Thomas 0. McGarity, Not So Paradoxical: The
Rationale for Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 Duke L J 729, 741-42 (arguing that it is
rational for society to do its best to prevent harm to public health and the environment
even if the resources devoted to pursuit of this goal exceed benefits predicted by the
"willingness to pay" measure of value).
08 Mobil Corporation, for example, states that it "opposed some of that legislation,
because we thought it might be too costly for the consumer. In retrospect, we were wrong.
Air quality is improving, at a cost acceptable to the motoring public." Mobil Corporation,
Informational advertisement, NY Times A29 (Oct 27, 1994).
" Robert W. Hahn, Achieving Real Regulatory Reform, 1997 U Chi Legal F 143, 149.
1o 42 USC § 7651 (1994).
. Michael E. Porter and Claas van der Linde, Toward a New Conception of the
Environment-Competitiveness Relationship, 9 J Econ Persp 97, 108 (Fall 1995).
112 Id.
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Chicago Board of Trade, spot allowances sold for average prices
of $159 in 1994, $132 in 1995, and $68 in 1996.113 The low pric-
es for which emissions allowances are selling demonstrates that
industry estimates of the costs of complying with Title IV were
greatly exaggerated.
114
Another reason why ex ante cost estimates are often too high
is that regulation can stimulate technological innovations that
dramatically reduce control costs. For example, prior to the deci-
sion to phaseout ozone-depleting chlorofluorocarbons ("CFCs"),
there was little incentive for industry to search for alternative
substances that did not harm the ozone layer. After regulatory
policy required dramatic reductions in CFC use, alternatives
were found much more quickly and at far lower cost than previ-
ously expected. In 1988, when the U.S. had agreed to reduce CFC
production by 50% by 1998, EPA estimated that this would cost
$3.55 per kilogram.1 Four years later, when the phasedown
had been broadened to encompass a complete ban by the year
2000, compliance costs had plunged to $2.20 per kilogram.11 In
similar fashion, the petroleum industry estimated in 1971 that
phasing lead additives out of gasoline would cost $7 billion per
year.1 7 In 1990, when 99 percent of the phaseout had been
completed, costs had proven to be 95 percent less than estimat-
ed.11 8
In many cases the benefits of environmental regulation have
been substantially understated by ex ante estimates because
regulated substances have subsequently been discovered to have
additional harmful effects or to cause harm at lower thresholds
than previously thought. In the early 1970s, when the EPA pro-
mulgated its initial limits on levels of lead in gasoline, the
113 Id.
"' Allowances have been selling for prices far below initial expectations because the
cost of reducing SO, emissions has been much lower than expected. The price of low-sulfur
coal has fallen due to improved mine productivity and reductions in the cost of trans-
porting coal by rail. The cost of installing scrubbers also has fallen substantially. Cyprus
Amax Sees Many Reasons for SO, Price, Air Daily 1 (Oct 25, 1995).
. EPA, Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 53 Fed Reg 30604, 30607 (1988).
EPA, Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 57 Fed Reg 31242, 31259 (1992).
17 William G. Rosenberg, Clean Air Act Amendments, 251 Science 1546, 1547 (1991).
Id. Many other examples are available. Innovations that removed all emissions of
VOC-releasing solvents during paint application significantly reduced compliance costs for
regulations concerning emission of volatile compounds during paint application. A discov-
ery by Aristech Chemical, which removed benzene from tar in the initial processing step,
eliminated the need for costly gas blankets and produced net savings instead of a substan-
tial cost increase in complying with regulations requiring reduction in emissions of ben-
zene. Porter and van der Linde, 9 J Econ Persp at 107-108 (cited in note 111).
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agency's goal was to keep lead levels in children's blood below 40
micrograms per deciliter."' Subsequently, research demonstrat-
ed that even substantially lower levels of exposure to lead cause
significant harm to health.20 As a result, the Centers for Dis-
ease Control has lowered what they considered to be the level of
medical concern for lead exposure in 1975, 1985 and 1991, until
it now stands at 10 micrograms per deciliter. 2' The EPA's 1984
cost-benefit analysis of lead phasedown did not consider the ef-
fects of lead exposure in boosting blood pressure in adult
males.'22 When this factor was added to the agency's 1985 anal-
ysis, the net benefits of the regulation increased by more than
five-fold."2 In his book Breaking the Vicious Circle, Supreme
Court Justice Stephen Breyer decries the cost of regulating min-
eral oil laden with polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) because it
avoids "health risks considerably lower than those accompanying
eating a raw mushroom. " "' However, while PCBs have long
been regulated as a carcinogen, a recent study suggests that they
also are powerful neurotoxins, reducing the IQs of children ex-
posed neonatally."
Benefits also may be underestimated because regulation can
generate positive externalities that usually are not captured by
traditional analyses. For example, a study by economists at the
World Resources Institute finds that conventional measures of
productivity fail to take into account productivity gains produced
by environmental amenities."2 The study concludes that these
are substantial, particularly in certain industries.'27 If regulato-
ry policy is to pay attention to adverse second-order effects, such
as the health effects of reduced income due to the costs of regula-
tion,"2 then it should also seek to trace the positive second-or-
der effects of regulation that are not captured by conventional
19 See Ethyl Corp. v EPA, 541 F2d 1, 38 (DC Cir 1976) (en banc).
12o Herbert L. Needleman, ed, Human Lead Exposure 39, 239-40 (CRC 1992).
121 Robert V. Percival, et al, Environmental Regulation: Law, Science, and Policy 631
(Little, Brown 2d ed 1996).
2 Id at 563.
3 Id at 565.
" Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation 17
(Harvard 1993).
"2 Robert Langreth, Exposure Before Birth to PCBs Is Linked To Lower IQs in Chil-
dren, Study Says, Wall St J B10 (Sept 12, 1996).
16 Robert Repetto, et al, Has Environmental Protection Really Reduced Productivity
Growth? We Need Unbiased Measures (WRI 1996).
I27 d at 15-19.
2 See Frank B. Cross, When Environmental Regulations Kill: The Role of
Health /Health Analysis, 22 Ecol L Q 729 (1995).
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analysis. Regulations that prevent deaths undoubtedly reduce
mental and emotional damage to families and friends of victims,
though such effects typically are not factored into conventional
benefits analyses.'"
As more detailed studies of environmental regulation are
completed, it is not surprising to find that environmental regula.-
tions are less costly and more beneficial than previously thought.
An EPA study released in November 1995 estimates that the
reductions in SO2 emissions required by Title IV will produce
annual health benefits in the eastern United States with a value
ranging from $12 billion to $78 billion by the year 2010.'
These reductions also are estimated to produce between $290
million and $1.87 billion in annual health benefits for Ontario
and Quebec, Canada. 3' Most of these benefits are calculated to
result from reductions in premature deaths (estimated at more
than 9,600 per year) and reduced cases of chronic bronchitis (esti.-
mated at more than 14,500 per year).'32 These estimates do not
even take into account the environmental benefits of reduced
damage to forests, lakes, streams, and buildings and improved
visibility. Because the costs of complying with Title IV are ex.-
pected to be only $2 billion to $3 billion per year, the program
now looks like a terrific bargain. 133
In June 1996 the EPA released a draft analysis of its esti.-
mates of the overall costs and benefits of the Clean Air Act from
1970 to 1990.'"4 The report found that the $20 billion annual
cost of the Act was producing total benefits of at least $400 bil-
lion per year.'35 Thus, the agency concluded that in 1990
"Americans received roughly 20 dollars of value in reduced risks
of death, illness, and other adverse effects for every one dollar
See Metropolitan Edison Co. v People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 US 766, 779
(1983) (holding that an environmental impact assessment by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission need not consider the psychological impact on local residents of restarting the
nuclear power plant that is the companion to the plant where the Three Mile Island
accident occurred).
" EPA, Human Health Benefits from Sulfate Reduction Under Title IV of the 1990
Clean Air Act Amendments S-8 (1995).
131 Id at S-6.
132 Id at S-5.
Jessica Mathews, Clean Sweeps: Two Success Stories for the Environment, Wash
Post A23 (Dec 18, 1995).
" EPA, The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act, 1970 to 1990 10, 64 (draft, 1996).
See also Gary Lee, Clear Air Regulations Are Paying Off, EPA Says, Wash Post A17 (June
10, 1996).
1 EPA, The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act, 1970 to 1990 at 10, 64 (cited in
note 134).
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spent to control air pollution."3 ' Overall, the EPA estimated
that the nation had spent $436 billion on air pollution control
between 1970 and 1990, which had yielded $6.8 trillion in bene-
fits.3 7 The agency found that air pollution controls extended
the lives of 140,000 people each year, reducing heart attacks by
18,000 per year, strokes by 13,000, and cases of hypertension and
respiratory illness by 15,000 and 16,000 per year."
Even if some environmental regulations have had substantial
net costs," 9 this does not mean that society's overall portfolio of
investments in environmental regulation has yielded negative
returns. Just like investors who face risk and uncertainty be-
cause market valuations of assets can change dramatically over
time, regulators cannot determine in advance what the ultimate
costs and benefits of regulatory action will be because they too
can change dramatically over time. Portfolio theory suggests that
a decision rule that only allows investments in "sure things" is
not the best way to maximize returns for private investors; it also
is not a good way to maximize social returns by insisting that
regulatory policy should eschew preventative regulation unless it
can be demonstrated prospectively to be a "sure thing.""4
C. The Uneasy Transition from Common Law to Preventative
Regulation
Environmental law's swift transition from a decentralized
system relying on common law principles to a federalized system
dominated by national regulatory programs has generated ten-
sions that contribute to some of the current resistance to environ-
mental regulation. These include the tension between the com-
mon law's insistence on individualized proof of causal injury and
136 Lee, Wash Post at A17 (cited in note 134).
137 Id.
"3 Id.
" For example, economist Robert W. Hahn challenges EPA's cost-benefit analysis of
the Clean Air Act by arguing that since "three-fourths of the quantifiable benefits of air
pollution controls result from reducing hazards from lead and particulate matter," then
"the tens of billions of dollars aimed at reducing smog and carbon monoxide may have
been a drain on the economy, thus hurting the average citizen." Robert W. Hahn, The
EPA's True Cost, Wall St J A18 (June 27, 1996).
"~' See, for example, the discussion of portfolio theory in Stuart D. Root, Suitabili-
ty-The Sophisticated Investor--and Modern Portfolio Management, 1991 Colum Bus L
Rev 287, 347-51; Michael T. Johnson, Speculating on the Efficacy of 'Speculation': An
Analysis of the Prudent Person's Slipperiest Term of Art in Light of Modern Portfolio
Theory, 48 Stan L Rev 419, 425-27 (1996) (investments with higher risks command higher
expected returns).
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the inherently probabilistic and uncertain nature of environmen-
tal consequences. Regulatory legislation sought to overcome this
problem by dispensing with common law causation requirements
and endorsing preventative regulation by expert administrative
agencies. But this left open the question of how much, and what
kind, of evidence agencies needed before they could regulate to
prevent suspected harm. The judiciary's initial endorsement of
preventative regulation"" and its effort to encourage agencies
to perform risk assessments142 have helped improve the quality
of agency decisionmaking. More recently, however, agencies have
been subjected to excessively demanding analytic requirements.
As a result, their efforts to achieve the environmental laws' ambi-
tious promises of preventative regulation have become mired in
persistent battles over burdens of proof and analytical thresholds.
The EPA and other agencies have had a disappointing track
record in implementing environmental, health, and safety legisla-
tion. The complex judgments required by these regulatory stat-
utes and the sheer volume of the responsibilities delegated to the
agencies has strained limited agency resources. Thus, it is not
surprising that only a handful of toxic substances have been
regulated by the EPA under the Toxic Substances Control
Act," while the Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
tion ("OSHA") has fallen hopelessly far behind in the task of
updating occupational exposure standards.1 " Budget con-
straints, turnover of technical staff, and the difficulty of obtain-
ing information readily available to the regulated community
make it extremely difficult for agencies to complete more than a
handful of major rulemakings in any given year. Thus, nearly
two decades after the enactment of comprehensive regulatory leg-
islation it was reported that "[n]o health and safety agency has
been able to promulgate regulations for more than three contro-
versial chemicals in any given year."145
As Congress has continued to expand the regulatory respon-
sibilities of agencies, the need for agencies to develop more effi-
cient rulemaking procedures has grown more urgent. Yet agency
efforts to use existing authorities to regulate in a more compre-
... Ethyl Corp., 541 F2d at 13.
42 Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v American Petroleum Institute, 448 US
607, 639-40 (1980) ("Benzene").Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle at 19 (cited in note 124).
i, Sidney A. Shapiro and Thomas 0. McGarity, Reorienting OSHA: Regulatory Alter-
natives and Legislative Reform, 6 Yale J Reg 1, 2-3 (1989).
"4 Id at 3.
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hensive fashion have met resistance in the courts. One approach
for streamlining regulation would be to permit agencies to adopt
interim standards based on substantially reduced information
thresholds while the agency gathers the necessary data to deter-
mine at what levels final standards should be set. When OSHA
was created, Congress realized that the Agency faced a mammoth
task in promulgating regulations to protect workers from expo-
sure to a plethora of workplace hazards. To ensure that workers
were provided with at least a modicum of protection, Congress
directed OSHA to adopt interim standards, without conducting
rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act.'" These
national consensus standards were to be set at levels already
established by a national standard-setting organization or al-
ready adopted by other federal agencies.'47 In 1971, OSHA
adopted exposure limits for approximately 400 chemicals based
largely on the Threshold Limit Values ("TLVs") adopted by the
American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists
("ACGIH") in 1968.'"
Although Congress contemplated that OSHA would revise
the interim standards to provide more protection to workers
through normal rulemaking proceedings, 49 OSHA did not at-
tempt to revise the standards to keep them up to date with
changes in the ACGIH TLVs until 1989, long after the TLVs had
been lowered for hundreds of the chemicals."5 Yet OSHA's ef-
forts to use generic rulemaking simply to update the standards to
reflect changes made by the ACGIH were struck down in court,
even though the agency estimated that the revisions would pre-
vent 55,000 occupational illnesses and 683 deaths annually. 5'
OSHA's difficulties are largely a product of the seemingly
modest analytical requirements imposed on the agency by the
Supreme Court's decision in the Benzene case.5 2 In the years
that followed this decision, OSHA conducted five risk assess-
1 29 USC § 655(a) (1994).
17 Id.
' See Thomas 0. McGarity and Sidney A. Shapiro, Workers At Risk: The Failed
Promise of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 123 (Praeger 1993).
49 29 USC § 655(bX5) (1994).
0 Department of Labor, Occupational Health and Safety Administration, Air Con-
taminants, 54 Fed Reg 2332 (Jan 19, 1989).
... AFL-CIO v OSHA, 965 F2d 962, 971-72, 975 (11th Cir 1992).
1"2 Benzene, 448 US at 639. A bare plurality of the Court rejected OSHA's effort to
lower the permissible exposure limit to benzene because OSHA had not performed a risk
assessment demonstrating that the significant risks to workers would be appreciably
reduced.
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ments that confirmed its original conclusion that benzene posed
extremely serious risks to workers."3 The risk assessments in-
dicated that workers exposed to benzene at levels permitted by
the existing standard faced excess leukemia risks ranging from
44 to 152 per 1,000.'" In 1987, OSHA finally adopted the very expo-
sure limit struck down by the Supreme Court.'55 OSHA con-
cluded that exposure to 10 ppm of benzene posed a risk of 95
additional leukemia deaths per 1,000 workers. This level of risk
was much greater than other toxic substance risks OSHA had
deemed significant (including arsenic, ethylene oxide, and ethyl-
ene dibromide) and was greater than the risk of accidental death
in high- and average-risk industries (where death risks ranged
from 30 to 3 in 1,000)." Due to judicial imposition of additional
analytic requirements, it took OSHA more than ten years to
lower the benzene standard to the very level the agency had
sought to adopt on an emergency basis in 1977, delaying regula-
tion that could have prevented the exposure of thousands of
workers to very significant risks.
For more than a decade, the EPA spent enormous staff re-
sources crafting a regulatory response to the risks posed by con-
tinuing uses of asbestos, a sabstance that has caused hundreds of
thousands of deaths, particularly among workers exposed in
occupational settings.157 The agency ultimately decided that be-
cause exposure to asbestos was so difficult to control and because
any exposure poses some risk of fatal disease, the most efficient
regulatory approach was to phaseout virtually all remaining uses
of asbestos, using its authority under the Toxic Substances Con-
trol Act ("TSCA")."5 The risks posed by asbestos were so high
5 Robert V. Percival, et al, Environmental Regulation: Law Science and Policy 512
(Little, Brown 2d ed 1996).
15 Id.
"' Department of Labor, Occupational Health and Safety Administration, Occupation-
al Exposure to Benzene, 52 Fed Reg 34460 (Sept 11, 1987).
"8 OSHA estimated that the new PEL would prevent at least 326 deaths from leuke-
mia and other blood diseases and that the actual number of deaths prevented would be
considerably greater. See id.
' It is estimated that more than 21 million Americans have experienced occupational
exposures to asbestos and that at least 200,000 of them will die by the end of the century
from cancers caused by asbestos. Irving Selikoff, Disability Compensation for Asbestos-
Associated Disease in the United States (Report to the Department of Labor, June 1981).
When all diseases caused by asbestos are considered, it is estimated that 265,000 people
in the United States will have died as a result of asbestos-related diseases by the year
2015. Paul W. MacAvoy, The Economic Consequences of Asbestos-Related Disease 37
(Working Paper No 27, 1982).
158 EPA, Asbestos; Manufacture, Importation, Processing, and Distribution in Com-
merce Prohibitions, 54 Fed Reg 29460 (1989).
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that the agency deliberately chose to focus only on the most easi-
ly quantifiable risks.159 Even though the EPA believed that its
quantitative risk assessment substantially underestimated the
true risks of continued asbestos use, perhaps by an order of mag-
nitude, it thought that it could demonstrate that the risk war-
ranted regulation. However, this regulation was struck down by
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Corrosion Proof
Fittings v EPA."e The court focused only on the risks the EPA
chose to quantify, disaggregated them on a product-by-product
basis, and faulted the agency for failing to provide detailed as-
sessments of the costs and benefits of less stringent alterna-
tives.1"' The Corrosion Proof Fittings decision illustrates how
extraordinary the barriers to regulation are today when a sub-
stance that is the paradigmatic candidate for a TSCA product
ban cannot be phased out.6 2
These and other decisions indicate that the implications of
the shift in regulatory policy away from a common law system
requiring individualized proof of causal injury to one dominated
by precautionary regulation have not been fully appreciated.
Courts are undermining the laws' promise of preventative regula-
tion not only by demanding increasingly detailed analytical sup-
port for regulation, but also by requiring more particularized
showings of harm before citizens are granted standing to enforce
the environmental laws."6 Despite doctrines of judicial defer-
ence, courts are rejecting, or requiring more detailed support for,
legislative and executive judgments concerning potential to cause
environmental harm."6 And the Supreme Court's reshaping of
159 Id.
160 947 F2d 1201 (5th Cir 1991).
181 Id at 1215.
162 See the discussion of the costs and benefits of the asbestos ban in Lisa Heinzerling,
Political Science, 62 U Chi L Rev 449, 463-64 (1995).
" This is occurring both with respect to the injury-in-fact and redressability prongs of
the standing doctrine. See, for example, Friends of the Earth, Inc. v Crown Central Petro-
leum Corp., 95 F3d 358, 361-62 (5th Cir 1996) (denying standing to environmental group
to bring citizen suit against petroleum refinery 18 miles upstream from where members
recreate; court suggests that plaintiffs should present water samples or expert testimony
demonstrating that the actual pollutants discharged are in the waters they use); Louisi-
ana Environmental Action Network v Browner, 87 F3d 1379, 1382-84 (DC Cir 1996) (one
national and two local environmental organizations denied standing to challenge regula-
tions governing EPA approval of state air pollution control programs on the ground that
the groups had not shown "an injury sufficiently imminent and concrete" because there
was no showing that EPA approval of inadequate state standards was imminent; court
also raised the possibility that even a showing that group members would breathe more
polluted air would not be sufficient for standing because "it is difficult to imagine a
grievance more generalized than one shared by all persons who breathe .... ").
1 Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003, 1031 (1992) (demanding
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constitutional doctrines underpinning federalism may make indi-
vidual demonstrations of effects on interstate commerce neces-
sary before certain kinds of environmental regulations can be
enforced.1"
III. THE FUTURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
As noted above, more than a dozen different initiatives are
underway to rethink the future of environmental regulation.
Preliminary results from these initiatives point to the emergence
of some common themes. First, there seems to be a fair amount
of consensus that the first generation of environmental laws and
regulations has been generally successful, and that we are now in
a position to make substantial improvements in regulatory policy.
Second, there is a growing willingness to experiment with new
approaches to regulation that promise improved environmental
performance in return for greater flexibility. Lessons derived
from past regulatory history suggest the following five principles
that should be used to shape future policy.
A. Greater Effort Should Be Devoted to Defining Environmental
Policy Goals
One of the frustrations with environmental policy has been
society's inability to agree on clear goals. This is partly a product
of the reactive manner in which the regulatory infrastructure
was constructed. The environmental laws incorporate necessarily
ambiguous directives to "protect human health and the environ-
ment,"1 prevent "unreasonable risk,"1 6 7 avoid "unreasonable
adverse effects,"1" and "create and maintain conditions under
which man and nature can exist in productive harmony."169 In
the rare instance in which a law specifies a clear goal-the Clean
Water Act's goals of "fishable, swimmable" waters by 1983 and
that harms sought to be prevented by regulations preventing development of real estate
be shown to constitute a common law nuisance before a takings claims can be avoided);
Dolan v City of Tigard, 512 US 374, 391 (1994) (striking down an exaction of property
rights sought as a condition to approving a development permit for failure to "make some
sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature
and extent to the impact of the proposed development.").
165 See, for example, Leslie Salt Co. v United States, 55 F3d 1388, 1392 (9th Cir 1995),
cert denied as Cargill, Inc. v United States, 116 S Ct 407, 409 (1995) (Thomas dissenting).
'' Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 USC § 6902(a)(4) (1994).
167 Clean Air Act, 42 USC § 7411(jX1XAXiii) (1994).
16 Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodentcide Act, 7 USC § 136a(a) (1994).
" National Environmental Policy Act, 42 USC § 4331(a) (1994).
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the prohibition of the "discharge of toxic pollutants in toxic
amounts"--they have been widely derided as hopelessly unrealis-
tic. 70 While legislative reluctance to specify more specific goals
and benchmarks in the regulatory statutes is understandable,
agencies undoubtedly can do a better job of defining what they
are seeking to achieve through the implementation of the envi-
ronmental statutes. The EPA already is moving in this direc-
tion,171 and such efforts should become an important part of fu-
ture policy as a means for evaluating agency performance.
B. The Best Approach to Regulation is a Mix of Regulatory
Tools-No Single Approach is Superior in All Contexts
An important consequence of the fragmented structure of the
environmental laws is that different regulatory approaches are
applied to different problems. As a result, we have acquired sub-
stantial experience with a variety of regulatory tools and we now
know a considerable amount about their advantages and draw-
backs. This experience suggests that the best approach to regula-
tion is to employ a mix of regulatory strategies that varies de-
pending upon the problem being addressed and the relative im-
portance of the various values served by each approach.
Shortly before it was abolished by the 104th Congress, the
Office of Technology Assessment ("OTA") prepared a comprehen-
sive review of the advantages and disadvantages of alternative
approaches to environmental regulation.'72 OTA identified sev-
en criteria for comparing regulatory tools 7 and factors for as-
sessing how well various regulatory tools satisfy these criteria.
OTA found that no single set of regulatory tools scored highly on
each of the criteria. 174
For example, if the primary concern of regulatory policy is
assurance that specific environmental goals will be met, harm-
based standards, design standards, technology specifications and
170 33 USC § 1251(aX2), (3) (1994).
171 EPA, Proposed Environmental Goals for America with Benchmarks for the Year
2005 (1995).
172 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Environmental Policy Tools: A
User's Guide (GPO 1995).
MTs These criteria included: (1) their cost-effectiveness and fairness, (2) the implemen-
tation demands they place on government, (3) the degree of assurance of meeting goals
that they provide, (4) the extent to which they promote pollution prevention and (5)
environmental justice and equity, (6) their adaptability to new information or new tech-
nology, and (7) their effect on technological innovation and diffusion. Id at 23.
"' Id at 198-200.
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product bans are effective tools.175 However, they may not be
very cost-effective or adaptable to change, particularly when
compared to tradeable emissions schemes, challenge regulation,
and informational approaches.17 Harm-based standards also
place considerable implementation burdens on government regu-
lators.'77 While informational approaches place the least burden
on regulators, they do not provide as much assurance of meeting
environmental performance targets.78 Thus, the report conclud-
ed that the best mix of regulatory tools will vary depending upon
the problem being addressed and the relative importance at-
tached to each criterion. 179
This is sound advice. Policymakers should try to select policy
tools for responding to a particular problem by considering how
important it is to set a fixed environmental performance target,
whether the problem is sufficiently localized to require a source
specific response, and what is the availability and cost of moni-
toring technology. They should also consider the magnitude and
variability of the costs that will be imposed on regulatory targets,
the difficulty of implementing various approaches, and whether
our understanding of the problem and the technology available
for controlling it is likely to improve significantly in the future.
In many cases, the best strategy is a mix of approaches that com-
bines clear regulatory targets with incentives to achieve im-
proved performance at lower cost. This is consistent with the
conclusion of the President's Council on Sustainable Develop-
ment, which found that "[b]asic standards of performance that
are clear, fair, and consistently enforced remain necessary," but
recommended that "the system should provide enhanced flexibili-
ty in return for superior environmental performance.""8
C. Regulatory Policy Should be More Sensitive to the Costs and
Benefits of Analytic Requirements in Order to Avoid "Paralysis
by Analysis"
Analytical requirements always have substantial theoretical
appeal. After all, who can oppose the notion that regulatory deci-
115 Id at 199.
'76 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Environmental Policy Tools (cited
in note 172).
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id at 200.
" President's Council on Sustainable Development, Sustainable America: A New
Consensus v (GPO 1996).
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sions should be based on consideration of the highest quality
information available? Yet the principle of diminishing returns
applies to information-gathering and analytical requirements as
well. At some point, the expense and delay occasioned by gather-
ing and considering additional information is more costly than
the value of the additional analysis.1"' Despite the enormous
informational and analytic demands now placed on agencies by
statute, internal agency procedures, executive oversight, and the
courts, some proponents of "regulatory reform" seek to bury agen-
cies with additional requirements as an explicit strategy for brak-
ing federal regulation. If adopted, these proposals would exacer-
bate the already serious problem of ossification of the rulemaking
process. 2
This is not to suggest that risk assessment should be aban-
doned, but rather that it should be employed in a genuine effort
to improve the quality of regulation, rather than as a disguised
tool for creating regulatory gridlock. President Clinton's executive
order on Regulatory Planning and Review1" employs a more
sensible approach than previous administrations by recognizing
that regulatory analysis will be most useful if applied in a selec-
tive fashion. The executive order directs agencies to "consider, to
the extent reasonable, the degree and nature of the risks posed
by various substances or activities within its jurisdiction," as a
means for setting regulatory priorities.' But it does not re-
quire that risk assessments be conducted for all regulations; nor
does it require that all regulations be submitted to OMB for
review. Instead, the thrust of the executive order is to require
such analysis and review only for the most significant regulatory
initiatives. "
The need to be more sensitive to the costs of analytic re-
quirements was recognized by the National Commission on Risk
Assessment and Risk Management in its June 1996 report."s
The Commission recommended that agencies adopt a more com-
18 See Daniel A. Farber, Revitalizing Regulation, 91 Mich L Rev 1278, 1294-95 (1993).
182 See Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on 'Deossifyinr the Rulemaking Process,
1992 Duke L J 1385. For an empirical study demonstrating the extent of ossification in
Clean Air Act rulemakings, see Steven J. Groseclose, Reinventing the Regulatory Agenda:
Conclusions from an Empirical Study of EPA's Clean Air Act Rulemaking Progress Projec-
tions, 53 Md L Rev 521 (1994).
" Executive Order 12,866, 3 CFR 638 (1993).
§ 1(bX4), Id at 639.
18 § 6(aX3), Id at 645.
18 Curt Suplee, Panel Criticizes Government's Regulation of Health Risks, Wash Post
A23 (June 14, 1996).
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prehensive and coordinated approach to risk management than
the current "chemical-by-chemical, medium-by-medium, risk-by-
risk strategy."187 The Commission decried the "paralysis by
analysis" that has frequently delayed regulatory action because of
uncertainties in assessment of risks and it recommended that
agencies be given greater freedom to concentrate on the most
serious problems.' The Commission's report opposed most of
the regulatory reform agenda promoted in the 104th Congress,
including proposals to subject regulatory decisions to greater
judicial scrutiny and to mandate compliance with cost-benefit
criteria.1 9 It argued that because courts "are not best equipped
to assess in detail and delve deeply into the technical science
that supports much agency decisionmaking," increased judicial
review could "prematurely disrupt" regulatory actions."9 While
supporting the consideration of economic factors in regulatory
decisions, the Commission concluded that cost-benefit analysis
should not be "an overriding determinant of risk management de-
cisions."'91
D. Opportunities to Improve Both the Fairness and Efficiency of
Existing Regulatory Programs Should Be Embraced Whenever
Consistent With Program Goals
Environmental policy should seize opportunities to improve
the fairness and efficiency of existing regulatory programs when-
ever this can be accomplished without undermining program
goals. Advocates of more efficient regulatory policies often have
foundered because of their refusal to address the distributional
consequences of their proposals. Measures that create a larger
pie are not likely to be adopted, if the pie benefits a few at the
expense of many. Thus, the pursuit of measures to make regula-
tory policy more efficient should be linked directly to measures to
make its benefits more broadly available.
There are several encouraging signs of movement in this
direction. Regulatory policy increasingly is turning to informa-
tional approaches that help harness the power of informed con-
sumers to promote environmental protection. 19 Consensus envi-
187 Id.
le Id.
189 Id.
190 Suplee, Wash Post at A23 (cited in note 186).
191 Id.
" Richard H. Pildes and Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U
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ronmental legislation adopted by Congress in 1996193 incorpo-
rated provisions that made regulatory standards more flexible
and efficient in return for measures to broaden the scope of
overall protection and to provide more information to consumers.
While the Food Quality Protection Act does not repeal the
Delaney clauses for food and color additives per se, it bars ap-
plication of the food additives Delaney clause to pesticide resi-
dues on food, replacing it with a "reasonable certainty of no
harm" standard.' It also endorses the EPA's use of ten-fold
margins of safety in regulating pesticides where inadequate in-
formation is available to assess children's vulnerability to
risk.1
95
The Clinton administration's "reinventing regulation" initia-
tives also move in this direction. In March 1995, the Clinton
administration proposed to extend schedules for compliance with
effluent standards for companies that agree to adopt innovative
treatment approaches to prevent pollution.'" It also endorsed
effluent trading, which would allow sources that reduce pollution
below the required minimum to acquire pollution allowances that
could be sold to other firms.97 The EPA has developed a policy
promoting effluent trading within watersheds. 9 ' The policy en-
dorses effluent trading as an innovative means for developing
solutions to water quality problems that will yield economic,
environmental, and social benefits.
Efforts to provide greater regulatory flexibility have also
been endorsed by the President's Council on Sustainable Develop-
Chi L Rev 1, 106-07 (1995) (discussing OSHA hazard communication standard, the
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, and nutrition labeling initia-
tives).
" Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, Pub L No 104-182, 110 Stat 1615,
codified at 42 USC § 300f et seq (1994 & Supp 1996); Food Quality Protection Act of 1996,
Pub L No 104-170, 110 Stat 1489; codified at 7 USC §136, 21 USC § 301 et seq (1994 &
Supp 1996).
'94 Food Quality Protection Act § 408(bX2XA), 110 Stat at 1516, codified at 21 USC
§ 346a(bX2XA) (1994 & Supp 1996).
"' § 408(bX2XC), 110 Stat at 1517, codified at 21 USC § 346a(bX2)(C) (1994 & Supp
1996).
9 Bill Clinton and Al Gore, Reinventing Environmental Regulations 43 (1995).
' The administration estimates that trades between industrial point sources could
save between $8.4 million and $1.9 billion in compliance costs for industry. Id at 19.
19 EPA, Effluent Trading in Watersheds Policy Statement, 61 Fed Reg 4994 (1996). A
few states have experimented with effluent trading programs. Wisconsin's program for
trading between point sources has not resulted in any trades. A program authorizing
trading between point and nonpoint sources at the Dillon Reservoir has been little used.
U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Environmental Policy Tools at 113 (cited
in note 172).
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ment. The Council concluded that basic regulatory standards
contained in existing environmental laws have been successful
and should not be relaxed.'" However, it found that the effi-
ciency and effectiveness of the current environmental manage-
ment system could be improved by developing new approaches to
regulation that emphasize performance targets rather than pre-
scribing the means for achieving them.2" The report recom-
mended that the EPA build upon its experience with Project XL
and the agency's Common Sense Initiative to develop new ap-
proaches to regulation that reduce compliance costs."° It also
concluded that government should encourage the development of
new products that help prevent pollution and preserve natural
resources.
202
The EPA has begun experimenting with "environmental
contracting" through its Project XL program.2 "a Project XL,
whose acronym stands for Excellence in Leadership, is designed
to provide businesses and state and local governments with
greater flexibility in deciding how to meet environmental stan-
dards.' Participants in the project enter into contracts with
the EPA that promise greater, multi-media reductions in pollut-
ant discharges than would be achieved through existing stan-
dards. 5
The EPA's Common Sense Initiative is examining how six
industry sectors can develop "cleaner, cheaper, smarter" ap-
proaches to reduce pollution.2' EPA Administrator Carol
Browner predicts that the EPA eventually will make most regu-
latory decisions on an industry-sector-by-industry-sector basis,
rather than relying on medium-specific regulation.2 7 One pro-
posal would rank industries on the basis of their environmental
"' President's Council on Sustainable Development, Sustainable America at 26 (cited
in note 180).
SId at 28.
"o Id at 34-36. See also Gary Lee, Regulators Urged to Alter Approach to Pollution,
Wash Post A3 (Feb 14, 1996).
' President's Council on Sustainable Development, Sustainable America at 38-39
(cited in note 180).
EPA, Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 60 Fed Reg 27282 (May 23,
1995). See also Project XL Launched With Announcement by President of First Eight
Participants, 26 Envir Rptr (BNA) 1179 (1995).
204 26 Envir Rptr (BNA) 1179 (cited in note 203).
Id.
See EPA, Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 60 Fed Reg 27282 (May 23,
1995). See also Metal-Finishing Group Urges Browner to Translate 'Common Sense" to
Action, 26 Envir Rptr (BNA) 1553 (1995).
20' 26 Envir Rptr (BNA) 1553.
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performance and vary the intensity of regulatory scrutiny on the
basis of these rankings.2 8
Some critics of environmental regulation have even gone so
far as to oppose efforts to increase regulatory flexibility on the
ground that such flexibility helps diffuse political opposition to
environmental policy.2" A more legitimate concern is the poten-
tial for abusing such flexibility by giving certain interests an
unfair advantage over their competitors. While environmental
law has not been nearly as prone to special interest deals as
economic regulation,210 it is important that objective standards
be developed for environmental contracting to prevent such abus-
es.211 Professor Rena Steinzor has questioned whether Project
XL will accomplish its goals.212 While praising the general con-
cept behind Project XL, she suggests that the EPA, in its haste to
get the project off the ground, is sacrificing too many regulatory
safeguards by approving projects with uncertain benefits and the
potential to undermine public participation and enforcement.213
She notes that an internal EPA newsletter quotes the agency's
staff as having coined the motto "If it isn't illegal, it isn't XL.""
E. More Effort Should be Devoted to Overcoming the Political
Barriers to Improved Regulatory Policy
Those who make a serious effort to "rethink regulation" ulti-
mately will recognize that far more fundamental environmental
progress could be accomplished by changing the nation's energy,
agricultural, and transportation policies to make them more
responsive to environmental concerns. The nation's tax system
levies the vast majority of taxes on labor and capital rather than
on waste and pollution.2 ' However, fundamental reforms in tax
2' Id.
2 See Ike C. Sugg, Beware Interior's 'Greater Flexibility", Wall St J A19 (Sept 16,
1996) (complaining that such flexibility would allow selective exemptions from "regula-
tions that might imperil local economies" and could be used "in an attempt to quell a
grassroots property rights rebellion.").
210 See Robert V. Percival, et al, Environmental Regulation: Law, Science and Policy
183 (Little, Brown 2d ed 1996).
21, Rena I. Steinzor, Regulatory Reinvention and Project XL: Does the Emperor Have
Any Clothes?, 26 Envir L Rptr 10527 (1996).
212 Id at 10529-32.
213 Id.
21 Id at 10527.
21 In 1996, the President's Council on Sustainable Development recommended that a
national commission be appointed to explore shifting the tax burden from income taxes to
pollution taxes and to review all existing tax and spending subsidies to ensure that they
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or energy policy are quickly dismissed as politically unrealistic.
Much more effort should be devoted to considering why such
policies are so unattractive politically and what, if anything, can
be done to change the political dynamics.
The enactment of consensus food safety and safe drinking
water legislation in 1996 demonstrates continuing bipartisan
support for environmental protection. It also demonstrates that
legislative gridlock can be overcome when measures are per-
ceived to provide some benefits to both industry and environmen-
tal interests that traditionally have been antagonistic. The enact-
ment of further environmental legislation may require the use of
consensus-building processes that foster compromises necessary
to overcome legislative gridlock.
CONCLUSION
Just as Stephen Jay Gould cautions against considering
trends in isolation and assuming that evolutionary processes
inexorably lead to biological progress, we should be cautious
about predicting the future of environmental regulation and focus
instead on the big picture. Viewed holistically, regulatory policy
appears to be evolving in a progressive direction.
In the face of enormous uncertainties over the prospective
costs and benefits of regulatory policy, society properly invested
in a portfolio of regulatory choices that produced positive returns
overall. Environmental compliance costs generally have proven to
be far less, and regulatory benefits substantially greater, than ex
ante estimates suggested. Instances of truly cost-blind regulation
have been exceedingly rare. When regulatory policy threatened to
impose truly draconian costs, political forces generally were suc-
cessful in blocking or moderating its implementation. In other
cases environmental policy has properly and explicitly pursued
values other than efficiency.
Like human evolution, environmental regulation has pro-
gressed to levels of greater complexity along an imperfect path.
This path has produced a rich and diverse mix of regulatory tools
that are continuing to evolve in ways that enhance human ability
to pursue multiple social goals.
did not undermine environmental goals. President's Council on Sustainable Development,
Sustainable America at 47 (cited in note 180). Cognizant of the political realities, the
Council recommended that the commission evaluate alternative mechanisms for overcom-
ing the political barriers to tax and subsidy reform. Id.
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Rather than retreating from its commitment to environmen-
tal protection, the United States is refining its regulatory system
to make it fairer and more efficient. These efforts will help defuse
persistent tensions between private law and public law principles
that were exacerbated by environmental law's swift transition
from the common law system to the regulatory state. While U.S.
environmental law has not fully achieved its promises of preven-
tative regulation, it is moving in a direction that will bring great-
er harmony between contemporary policies and the common law
principles from which it evolved.
